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Book Review
CIVIL PROCEDURE, Second Edition. By Fleming James, Jr. and
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Boston and Toronto; Little, Brown
& Co., 1977. Pp. 711.
As a law student at the University of Chicago, the only horn-
book I ever purchased was the Fleming James text on Civil
Procedure.' The primary reason for this rash act was the fear in
my heart and the knot in my stomach that was caused by Pro-
fessor Geoffrey Hazard's aggressive and energetic teaching of
the first year course in Civil Procedure. After having finished
the new text on Civil Procedure by Professor James, now co-
authored by Professor Hazard, I only wish that I had seen fit to
have read the first edition.
2
Professor Hazard, like most Civil Procedure teachers, was
very much aware of the student's need for a supplementary
outside source to augment the basic law school course in civil
procedure. In 1963, he noted the "peculiar omission in doctrinal
writing in procedure" of a "satisfactory up-to-date text designed
for students."3 The James book, published two years later, was
welcomed with almost unanimous professional acclaim.4 Pro-
fessor James was praised for his "unusual sensitivity to the
problems that beset beginning students, ' 5 and it was claimed
1. FLEMING JAMES, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE, (1965).
2. Professor Hazard was at least partly responsible for my failure to use
extensively the first edition of the James text. He advised my first year class not
to read every outside source suggested by our professors. That seemed like such
good advise that I never sought any appreciable return on my $12.00 investment.
His advise was predicated upon the valid notion that as students we would be
better off thinking about problems and working them through ourselves with-
out seeking high and low for some magic source which would eliminate our
uncertainties, cure our frustrations, and make us wise in all matters of legal
knowledge. (the advise of the apostle Paul in Phillipians 2:12.)
3. G. HAZARD, RESEARCH IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 52 (1963).
4. See Van Alstyne, BOOK REVIEW, 19 STAN. L. REV. 487 (1967); Walz, BOOK
REVIEW, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1183 (1966); Sullivan, BOOK REVIEW, 18 J. LEGAL ED. 465
(1966); Jacoby, BOOK REVIEW, 54 GEO. L. J. 414 (1965); and Field, BOOK REVIEW, 75
YALE L. J. 166 (1965).
5. Field, supra at 166.
that the book would "deservedly be blessed by generations of
law students and its publication . ..a cause for rejoicing by
procedure teachers."'6
The need for an explanatory companion for the basic law
school course in civil procedure is probably greater than any
other course. Most students bring some common knowledge to
first year courses which help them to understand the new con-
cepts they are learning in torts, contracts, and even property.
Students bring very little of this to a civil procedure course.
They begin by mispronouncing "demurrer" and then things go
progressively downhill. Learning the new language of the law
seems particularly acute to students in the procedure course.
Not only are they expected to learn the new procedural con-
cepts, but it also appears as if they are expected to have already
comprehended the material from their substantive courses.
Some casebooks compound the student's inherent difficulty by
starting the course with such potentially confusing and difficult
cases as Pennoyer v. Neff.7 Procedure is difficult enough to
make comprehensible without such a start.8
Professors James and Hazard continue the basic organiza-
tional pattern of the first edition. The student is introduced to a
general discussion of the difference between procedural and
substantive law. A helpful attempt is made to describe the role
of the adversary in the overall legal system. There is a boullion
cube history of the use of the king's courts and the growth of the
more modern systems with ample references to more meaty
discussion elsewhere. The general discussion of remedies is con-
fusing, particularly with reference to the declaratory judgment.
The text then turns to a discussion of the allocation of respon-
sibility between the state and federal courts. The Erie9 doctrine
is discussed in a brief, but straightforward fashion. Recogniz-
ing the difficulties of that doctrine and related choice of law
problems, the authors familiarize the beginning student with
the problems without getting bogged down in unnecessary com-
plications. The coverage of such advanced procedural problems
in a summary fashion is consistent with the authors' desire of
providing a helpful book for the beginning student. There are,
however, ample references to more advanced treatment of the
6. Id. at 173.
7. 95 U.S. 814 (1877). The otherwise excellent COUND, FRIEDENTHAL, and
MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE, (1974) is an offender in this regard.
8. Compare the James and Hazard text where jurisdiction is discussed in
the twelfth of thirteen chapters.
9. Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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subject for the guidance of new law professors, practitioners
and upper division students.10
The book's history of lawsuit is somewhat disappointing in
that so little information is provided. The text follows with an
extensive discussion in a chronological order of each of the
stages of the lawsuit, but a more comprehensive initial treat-
ment would have been of considerable help in allowing the
student to get a grasp of the overall system. This shortcoming is
a minor one for students whose assigned casebooks already
contain an extended summary of the various stages of a law-
suit.,,
In discussing each stage of a lawsuit, the authors concentrate
on the approach of the federal rules in resolving procedural
problems. Common law pleading and code pleading approaches
are also noted. One major difference between the first and sec-
ond edition is the more limited treatment of historical matters.
This is particularly noticeable with the absence in the second
edition of the detailed textual materials that are found in the
footnotes to the first edition. For the beginning student, the
concentration on the federal rules and the deemphasis of histor-
ical material undoubtedly makes the new text more usable. For
others, much intellectually interesting and stimulating informa-
tion is lost unless reference is made back to the first edition.
The second edition's section on discovery has undergone sub-
stantial revision because of the 1970 changes to the federal
rules. 2 Professors James and Hazard do an excellent job in
describing the various kinds of discovery devices with helpful
advise as to the tactical advantages and disadvantages of par-
ticular approaches. The inclusion of a more forceful statement
of the importance of discovery in modern day litigation would
10. The summary approach even with its twin risks of oversimplification
and confusion are certainly preferable to the almost total lack of any discussion
of choice of law problems as in Professor Milton D. Green's student text on civil
procedure. GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE, Foundation Press (1972). Nonethe-
less, the Green text has often been preferred by students to the earlier James
work because of Green's concentration on the more basic black letter law
needed in a first year civil procedure course.
11. Excellent in this regard is LOUISELL AND HAZARD, PLEADING AND PROCE-
DURE, 1-14 (1973).
12. See generally, Advisory Committee's Explanatory Statement Con-
cerning Amendment of the Discovery Rules, 38 F.R.D. 487 (1970).
have been in the beginning law student's better interest. Too
many young attorneys have inadequately served the interest of
their clients because of a lack of appreciation of the full impor-
tance of pre-trial discovery.
The textual treatment of the trial itself is as clear and concise
as any chapter in the book. Its explanations of the various as-
pects of burden of proof almost accomplished something of a
miracle by making the concept comprehensible. Of particular
merit is the book's treatment of the constitutional right to a jury
trial.13 Coming under criticism is the Supreme Court's decision
in Colgrove v. Battin4 which held that a jury of six was consist-
ent with the requirements of the Seventh Amendment. In what
they consider to be a duly reasoned opinion, the authors find a
bright spot in that, in the long run, the less costly smaller jury
may lead to more jury trials thus enhancing what the authors
believe to be a crucial part of our civil justice system.
The last half of the book concentrates on the more difficult
areas of civil procedure. Chapters on parties and joinder are
both excellent although it is generally recognized that Professor
Reed has written the landmark article on joinder of parties."
The chapter on judgments and the concept of res judicata is
substantially changed from the first edition necessitated in
large part by the Supreme Court's 1971 decision in Blonder-
tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Illinois6 in which the
Court rejected the "mutuality" doctrine. The authors are still
not fully comfortable with that approach and are at pains to
develop rationale for limiting the scope of the Bernhard17 _ Is-
rael'8- Blonder-tongue line of cases.
The chapter on jurisdiction is concentrated and difficult but
is a must reading for anyone researching the field. The exten-
sive footnotes make it possible to branch out to a more complete
understanding of many subtle problems only briefly mentioned
in the James and Hazard discussion. Appellate review which
was discussed in the first edition as one section in the chapter on
judgments has now been treated under a separate heading in
13. That is in keeping with Professor James' classic law review article in the
field. James, Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655 (1963).
14. 413 U.S. 149 (1973).
15. Reed, Compulsory Joinder of Parties in Civil Actions (Parts 1 and 2),
55 MICH. L. REV. 327, 483 (1957). Also excellent is Hazard, Indispensable Party:
The Historical Origin of a Procedural Phantom, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1254 (1961).
16. 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
17. Berhnard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
18. Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., N.Y. 2d 116, 151 N.Y.S. 2d 1,134 N.E. 2d 97
(1956).
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the last chapter of the text. Despite the high quality of the
discussion in the earlier edition, the new classification and ex-
panded coverage of the appellate review material is a definite
improvement.
The second edition is in many ways a better written book than
the first edition. For example, the first edition states that "pro-
cedure should serve the cause of administration efficiency."'19
The second edition states simply that "procedure should not be
too costly in time and money. '20 Nonetheless, there is an extrav-
agance in the first book that is not repeated in the new text. The
old James text, in the same manner as his treatise on torts,2 1
discusses at length both in the text and in the footnotes issues
which could correctly be called peripheral. Of course, a careful
editing might eliminate such material but would also take away
much of the fun and intellectual excitement.
With the exception of an inadequate index,22 the new James
and Hazard text will no doubt be easier for the beginning stu-
dent to read than the older edition.23 Although both editions
have roughly the same number of pages, the new text has fewer
lines per page and larger print for the footnotes. Many research-
ers, however, will continue to use the first edition for its more
extensive footnotes. An illustration of the different scope of the
footnotes is revealed by looking at the number of pages in the
two different tables of cases. The first edition contains 35 pages
of listings while the second edition contains only six pages.24
The limited number of cases cited in the second edition together
with a shallow index will make it more difficult for students to
be selective in reading this otherwise excellent up-date and revi-
sion. For those students who not only buy this book but actually
read it, they will find no easy answers or magic resolutions of all
procedural problems, but they will find that any investment of
time and energy will be richly rewarded.
JAMES D. MCGOLDRICK*
19. James, supra at 2.
20. James, supra note 1 at 2.
21. HARPER AND JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS (1956).
22. Five pages in the second edition versus 38 pages in the first edition.
23. See note 9 supra.
24. The some 2,500 cases in the James, first edition, outnumber the second
edition by a 5 to 1 margin. The Green text on civil procedure (see note 9) contains
close to 1,500 cases in its table of cases.
* Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law.

THE RIGHT AND THE POWER: THE PROSECUTION OF WATERGATE.
By Leon Jaworski. Reader's Digest Press, distributed by
Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 666 Fifth Avenue, New York,
New York, 10019. 1976. Pp. 306. $9.95.
It may well be true that when all of the books about Watergate
have been written and read, we will still have a persistent feel-
ing that we do not have a very clear view of what happened or
the meaning of it all. Because the essential nature of the crimes
were conspiracy, coverup, obstruction of justice and illegal
campaign practices, no one person seems to hold a complete
view of Watergate. The best that one can hope for are perspec-
tives. Since so much of what has already been written is the
product of those who were involved in the improper activity, it
is refreshing that we have the perspective of a person who,
because of extensive investigation, is best able to give us a
picture of known facts without having to exculpate himself.
Leon Jaworski came to the prosecution of Watergate at a
critical point in our history. Ignoring his promise to cooperate
fully in the investigation of Watergate by protecting the inde-
pendence of then Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox, President
Nixon had refused Cox's request for recordings of presidential
conversations and had ordered Cox to refrain from seeking
further tapes. When Cox announced that he would continue to
press for the tapes, Nixon ordered Attorney General Elliot
Richardson to fire Cox. When Richardson and Deputy Attorney
General Ruckelshaus had both refused to fire Cox, precipitat-
ing their own resignations, Nixon finally succeeded through
Solicitor General Robert Bork. The country was then without
an Attorney General and without a Special Prosecutor, two
positions in which the American people had substantial confi-
dence at the time. The result was a tremendous crisis of confi-
dence in the integrity of government and a furious response on
the part of the Congress, the press and the public.
To restore the confidence of the public, General Alexander
Haig, White House Chief of Staff, asked Leon Jaworski to be-
come Special Prosecutor on October 30, 1973. Jaworski was not
new to the role, having served as a war crimes prosecutor at
Nuremberg and as a Special Prosecutor in the case of The
United States against Governor Ross Barnett of Mississippi.
Although somewhat doubtful about the administration's will-
ingness to guarantee the independence necessary for a special
prosecutor, Jaworski was finally persuaded to accept the posi-
tion by an agreement that he could not be fired without a "sup-
porting consensus from the leadership of both parties in the
House and Senate as well as the leadership of both parties in the
House Judiciary Committee and the Senate Judiciary
Committee."
The central drama of this book is the continuing effort by
Jaworski to obtain the presidential tapes and other pertinent
documentation by the White House. Detailing very carefully the
need for and relevancy of the tapes, Jaworski describes the
behind-the-scenes struggle with General Haig and Fred
Buzhardt to obtain needed information. Much of the struggle
centers around definitional problems of whether presidential
activity is criminal when undertaken to correct or respond to
activity deemed by the executive to be a threat to the national
interest. The final line which is drawn in the controversy is the
refusal of the President to submit to due process of law under
the claim of executive privilege. For the lawyer reading this
book, Jaworski does a masterful job of interweaving the histor-
ical and constitutional arguments with the ongoing struggle be-
tween the executive and legislative branches.
Also woven into the central drama are a number of other
important events connected with the prosecution of Watergate.
One of these is Jaworski's assessment of those lesser characters
who were convicted. From Egil Krogh, whom Jaworski believed
to have been overwhelmed by the corrupting influence of pow-
er, to Dwight Chapin who directed much of the dirty tricks
during the 1972 campaign, the book details the criminal charges
brought against each and the factual bases for the charges that
resulted in guilty pleas or convictions. Another event is the
decision as to whether or not to name the President in a criminal
indictment. The author details the case against the President
leading to a conclusion that a prima facie case against the
President could be made on the charges of conspiracy to ob-
struct justice and to obstruct a criminal investigation. With the
intervening resignation of the President, however, Jaworski
faced much more difficult decisions which are at the very heart
of American jurisprudence: What purposes will be served by
the trial of a former President? Can any jurisdiction assure Mr.
Nixon of a fair trial given the nationally televised Senate and
House hearings on Watergate and the attendant press publicity?
Jaworski quotes at length from a staff memorandum urging
indictment on the basis that to refuse to indict would sanction a
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different standard of conduct before the law for a President.
Believing that a fair trial could not be assured, Jaworski obvi-
ously leaned toward refusing to indict although the pardon by
President Ford obviated the need for a final decision.
In summary, this book is a well written perspective of Water-
gate from the prosecution standpoint. For lawyers it is espe-
cially interesting because of the excellent interweaving of factu-
al background into the prosecutorial decisions which had to be
made. For the person seeking some objectivity about Watergate
this book is required reading.
CHARLES I. NELSON*
* Professor Nelson is Assistant Dean and Professor of Law, Pepperdine
University School of Law.

